

This change came about as a result of the transfer of the Bearcat base camp from the 1st Infantry Division to the 4th Infantry Division. The battery was also given the mission of general support/reinforcing the 54th Artillery Group.<sup>59</sup>

Battery "A" also engaged in a series of moves. The first occurred on December 27, 1966, when they moved from Bearcat to Lai Khe. No incidents occurred during this move. A second permanent change of station occurred on February 3, 1967, when the battery moved to Quan Loi. Again no incidents occurred.<sup>60</sup>

During November and December, 1966 the Battalion conducted tests with the 175mm gun to determine the effectiveness of the various types of fuzes (quick and delay) in the jungle. Rounds were fired into single canopy jungle, double canopy jungle and triple canopy jungle, and into open areas. An evaluation team consisting of the Battalion Commander, the S-3 Officer and EOD personnel entered the test area in each type of jungle after each type of fuze was fired to see which was the most effective. It was found that fuze quick was better than fuze delay in single canopy jungle. It avoided the deep burrowing action prevalent with the latter. Fuze delay was better in double and triple canopy jungle as it penetrated the primary growth. The effect of fire was not absorbed by foliage. Fuze quick yielded tree bursts.<sup>61</sup>

The target area survey project was begun in December 1966 and enabled the Battalion to produce more accurate firing data. The project worked in the following manner: the Battalion survey team set up a series of known survey points on towers throughout the Battalion's tactical area. These points were visible from the air. An air observer then flew in a helicopter to certain prominent terrain features. When the aircraft reached a point directly above the target area, the air observer instructed the pilot to hover at that point. The OH-13 (visible from the towers) was then intersected by two ground observers at the command of "Mark". The coordinates of the aircraft and of the target below were then sent to the Fire Direction Centers as a registration point. This system was fully operational by the Spring of 1967.

In January, 1967 the Battalion Commander read in a magazine about a new, sophisticated target acquisition device known as the Manpack Personnel Detector (Chemical). This device was able to locate personnel by detection of their body odors. Nicknamed the "sniffer", it reacted to the ammonia

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<sup>59</sup>Operational Report, Oct 66, p. 3.

<sup>60</sup>Operational Report, Feb 67, p. 8.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid, p. 10.

emitted by humans, and to smoke. Shortly thereafter LTC O'Connor and CPT Jack Jones (then the Battalion's Aviation Officer) secured two of these machines from ACTIV in Saigon to test their effectiveness in the Battalion's aerial reconnaissance program. As the Personnel Detector was at that time still in the experimental stages, the Battalion had no previous experience from which to draw. The Dector was mounted behind the back seat in the L-19 aircraft, with the detector probe being mounted on the wing strut. The air observer then monitored the dial as the pilot flew at low level over suspected enemy locations. When the dial indicated the presence of personnel below, the pilot then flew back and forth over the "hot" area to determine the exact enemy location. Readings were generally downwind from the actual enemy location. Results of use of the sniffer were generally encouraging. Several base camps were discovered by the sniffer. It was used to support several operations conducted by the Special Forces and the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The Battalion suggested two modifications to the machine. The dial was moved from its original position on the probe to a new location inside the aircraft, and the sound indicator (which gave an audio indication of the same information as appeared on the dial) was modified so that it could be comfortably used inside the aircraft. Both of these modifications were adopted by ACTIV. The Manpack Personnel Detector proved useful enough to be utilized by many other units, including the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions. The Battalion's experiences with the detector undoubtedly aided other units in their own use of the machine.<sup>62</sup>

The 6/27th steadily improved its ability to communicate throughout early 1967. A 70' high FM mast was constructed on the Battalion Headquarters building. It increased the range of the FM radios and improved the clarity of transmission by 75%. The KW-7/TSEC radios were modified so that daily settings could be accomplished in two minutes instead of twenty. Wire lines were laid to some of the RF/PF outposts near Phuoc Vinh. The radio repairmen in "HQ" Battery constructed control boxes for the Battalion FDC. These enabled one operator to operate and transmit from any one of three radios. They also constructed a "Cease Fire" alarm system so that the operations section could rapidly inform the FDC of a check fire. A training program for new radioteletype operators was begun. These men were refreshed on tuning procedures, teletype procedures and given practice for two weeks before being put on the job.<sup>63</sup>

In January, 1967 ground was broken for the Battalion's biggest civil affairs project to date - the construction of a small hospital for the villagers of Nuoc Vang. This hamlet, like most in Vietnam, had been troubled for many years by the lack of medical care for its citizens. Though the

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<sup>62</sup>Interview, CPT Ronald F. Williamson, Bn Avn Off, 6 Jun 67.

<sup>63</sup>Interview, MSG Robert L. Hughes, Bn Comm Off, 6 Jun 67.

dispensary at Phuoc Vinh was only four miles away, the villagers could make the trip to it only with the utmost difficulty. Thus the idea of the hospital was conceived to alleviate this situation. It was a cooperative project between the men of the Battalion and the villagers. Assistance was given by the Phu Giao District Chief, Major Lu Yem, and by the MACV adviser for this area, Major James Hall. The project was placed under the overall control of the Battalion Surgeon, with the "HQ" Battery Commander in charge of the actual construction.

This building was not constructed without interference from the VC. Although the villagers cooperated willingly with the Americans at first, the VC stepped up their campaign of intimidation in Nuoc Vang, hoping to undo with coercion what the Americans would do with friendship and cooperation. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry conducted a search and seal operation in the Nuoc Vang area to provide temporary security.<sup>64</sup> A permanent solution did not occur, however, until a Popular Forces outpost was constructed near the village. This project was initiated by the 6/27th. "HQ" Battery's wire section laid an eight mile long wire line between this outpost and the District Chief's compound in Phuoc Vinh. The wire was placed overhead the entire eight miles. The school-house adjacent to the hospital was painted at the same time by the men of Headquarters Battery. The hospital was dedicated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony on May 24, 1967. This was the same day that the Battalion fired its 125,000th round in Vietnam, and its 100,000th round in the III Corps Tactical Zone. A 175mm gun was brought to Nuoc Vang for this commemorative firing. This ceremony effectively demonstrated the contrast between war and peace that was typical of the war in Vietnam. As LTC O'Connor explained, Nuoc Vang typifies the reason, the justification, of the human and financial effort involved in firing 125,000 rounds." Largely through the efforts of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, the residents of this village were able to live with a considerably higher degree of security. Moreover, the hospital stood ready to give modern medical treatment to those that were sick. The hospital was a symbol of the friendship of the Americans of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for the Vietnamese of Nuoc Vang, a symbol that would endure long after the smoke of the Battalion's guns had blown away.<sup>65</sup>

Though there was a promise of hope at Nuoc Vang, progress in bringing a better life and more security to other areas seemed slight. A great increase in the tempo of Free World Forces operations supported by the 6/27th artillery could be noted in the last quarter of 1966 and the first half of 1967. In the eleven month period between November, 1965 and September, 1966 the Battalion fired approximately 47,000 rounds. From October, 1966 through June, 1967 the Battalion fired over 87,000 rounds.

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<sup>64</sup>The Redleg Courier, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 1 and p. 6.

<sup>65</sup>Extracted from draft of speech delivered by LTC O'Connor at Nuoc Vang, 24 May 67.

Thirty thousand of these rounds were fired in the I Corps Tactical Zone, with the remainder being fired in the III Corps Tactical Zone.<sup>66</sup>

The Battalion continued its support of combat operations through the latter part of 1966 and into 1967. CEDAR RAPIDS I (18 July 1966 to 24 July 1966), CEDAR RAPIDS II (24 July 1966 to 25 July 1966), UNIONTOWN (9 August 1966 to 14 August 1966) and GALLUP (16 August 1966 to 21 August 1966) were all operations which the Battalion supported from its base camps.

On Operation AMARILLO, the Battalion supported the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, the Phu Giao District Forces and the 48th ARVN Regiment in clearing and securing Route 16. This was a search and destroy operation. On the morning of August 24, 1966 contact was made with the famed Phu Loi Battalion, who were then in their base camp. The 6/27th fired 1,396 rounds at this base camp in support of friendly forces in the next 48 hours. Many of the 178 VC who were killed in this battle were attributed to artillery fire.<sup>67</sup>

Operations LINCOLN (8 September 1966 to 12 September 1966), LONGVIEW (24 September 1966 to 30 September 1966) and TULSA (2 October 1966 - 15 October 1966) followed. The Battalion was assigned the mission of general support/reinforcing the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division during Operations BATTLECREEK (10 November 1966 to 19 November 1966) and BISMARCK (25 November 1966 to 9 December 1966). The latter operation secured Route Red for a resupply convoy from Phuoc Vinh to Di An.

During Operation CANARY (11 December 1966 to 19 December 1966) Battery "A" displaced an 8" howitzer platoon to an area south of Bearcat to support the 173d Airborne Brigade. Operation CEDAR FALLS (8 January 1967 to 17 January 1967) was a huge push into the famed "Iron Triangle", a hitherto unapproachable bastion that was the headquarters of the Phu Loi Battalion. It was the largest operation of the war to date. Battery "A" moved from Bearcat to Lai Khe to participate in it. On January 6, 1967 the battery exchanged two of its 8" howitzers with crews for two 175mm guns with crews from Bravo Battery, 2d Battalion, 32nd Artillery. This was directed by II Field Force in order to better support Operation CEDAR FALLS. Both the 8" and 175mm gun sections of Battery "A" fired extensively in support of this operation, performing in a general support/reinforcing role for the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. During Operation Saratoga (25 January 1967 to 29 January 1967) the Battalion supported the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in its search of the Bong Trang jungle. This was followed by a resupply convoy.<sup>68</sup>

Support of Special Forces camps by the Battalion was considerably intensified throughout the Winter and Spring of 1967. The target area survey was expanded to each camp. The survey section from Headquarters Battery visited each camp in the Phuoc Vinh - Quan Loi area (five in all) and determined the exact coordinates of a series of points in and around

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<sup>66</sup>Operational Status, 13 June 1967.

<sup>67</sup>Meritorious Unit Commendation, 26 Nov 66, p. 1.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid, pp. 1-2.

each camp. These were then plotted on an overlay. Use of these overlays by the Camp Commander enabled him to supply the Battalion FDC with exact coordinates when his camp was under attack. This significantly improved the Battalion's reaction time during one of these attacks.

In May, 1967 the Battalion S-3 conducted a series of classes at each supported Special Forces camp. Artillery techniques and tactics (to include fire planning) were informally discussed. Four points were emphasized: how to get a round to the target area, what to do with it once it was there, and how to plan fires and characteristics of heavy artillery. These classes enabled the Special Forces personnel to effectively plan artillery fire without the aid of a liaison officer from the Battalion.<sup>69</sup>

Support of Special Forces patrols and operations increased in this same time frame. The 6/27th determined future Special Forces operations through frequent liaison visits to each camp. This advance notice enabled the Battalion to pre-lay a tube in the direction of the future operation area, cutting the Battalion's reaction time and gave the Special Forces better artillery support. Liaison officers, and in some cases forward observers, were sent from the Battalion to the Special Forces elements to assist in fire planning. This resulted in more timely artillery support and better utilization of effective firepower. On one occasion the presence of a liaison officer at the Tong Le Chan Special Forces camp greatly reduced the time lapse lost in retransmission of fire data to the fire support headquarters. That camp's China Boy element had been nearly surrounded by an enemy force, but rapid utilization of artillery broke the back of the attack.<sup>70</sup>

On the evening of February 1, 1967 a patrol from the Dong Xoai camp made contact with a small VC force. Artillery was immediately called in. The first round landed squarely upon the trail that the VC were using. A short while later this same patrol began receiving machine gun fire. Artillery was again called in, but contact was broken before the second volley could be fired.<sup>71</sup>

On May 7, 1967 the Special Forces "Sigma" detachment made contact with an estimated VC platoon north of Dong Xoai. Contact was brief, but intense. The forward observer team consisting of two officers and two enlisted men from the 6/27th immediately called for close artillery support. As there were no 105mm howitzers within range, 175mm guns from Charlie Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery had to be utilized in a close support role. Rounds were directed to within 400-600 meters of friendly positions.

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<sup>69</sup>Interview, CPT George F. Palladino, En S-3, 6 Jun 67.

<sup>70</sup>Interview, CPT George F. Palladino, En S-3, 6 Jun 67.

<sup>71</sup>BC & Staff Call, 2 Feb 67.

Ten rounds were fired, all of which landed squarely on target. These defensive fires of the 175mm gun were felt to be very effective.<sup>72</sup>

On May 11, 1967 another Special Forces patrol (the Sigma detachment) made contact with an estimated 400 VC. According to reports this enemy force was enroute to one of its base camps and had become lost in the jungle. Artillery and air strikes were called in. Charlie Battery fired 130 eight inch rounds and 179 one seven five millimeter rounds. LTC O'Connor directed the firing of these rounds from his OH-13 helicopter. A total of 43 enemy dead was the result of the severe pounding of the area by air and artillery. The Sigma force was able to capture 2½ tons of medical supplies from this enemy unit.<sup>73</sup>

On May 27, May, 1967 a patrol consisting of 85 CIDG personnel and two advisers was attacked by an estimated two VC companies. The Battalion Commander immediately flew to the home base of this patrol (Chi Linh Special Forces Camp) to gather information. He found that this patrol was overrun by the enemy, resulting in three friendly casualties. Battery "C" had fired in support of this patrol, but was forced to cease fire due to a denial of air clearance.<sup>74</sup> Two days later the Chi Linh camp requested preparatory fires on two locations. The Battalion S-2 flew over the target area three hours previous to the beginning of the fires. He noted immediately that the friendly forces were not in the area given as their location by the Camp Commander. He ordered the friendly troops to mark their location by smoke. The S-2 then ordered an immediate check fire, probably saving lives by his alertness.<sup>75</sup>

One of the Battalion's more notable accomplishments was its continued destruction of VC base camps. A total of 14 of these camps were destroyed in December, 1966 alone, with an additional 11 more in January, 1967.<sup>76</sup> Though most of these were small, consisting mainly of a few huts and bunkers, an occasional battalion sized base camp was found. One of these was discovered in a remarkably preserved state (even after it had been fired upon). This particular camp was visited by approximately 24 persons from the Battalion on January 29, 1967. This was done so that these personnel would have a clearer picture of what they were shooting at. This base camp was then

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<sup>72</sup>SITREP, dtd 7 May 67.

<sup>73</sup>Interview, MSG Austin Price Jr., En Opns Sgt, 12 May 67.

<sup>74</sup>SITREP, dtd 28 May 67.

<sup>75</sup>SITREP, dtd 2 Jun 67.

<sup>76</sup>As reported on the "Redleg Scoreboard", a daily summary of battalion accomplishments.

partially destroyed by artillery directed to the camp by these personnel from a position some 800 meters distant.<sup>77</sup>

On March 19, 1967 the Popular Forces outpost at An Linh (some three miles from Phuoc Vinh) was subjected to intense mortar and small arms fire from a large enemy force. Several casualties were sustained, creating a necessity for ground medical evacuation. The Battalion Commander dispatched a medical aid team and small security force to the scene. This force was able to successfully extract the wounded Popular Forces soldiers in spite of the fact that they were exposed to hostile fire. No friendly casualties were sustained during the extraction.<sup>78</sup> A few days later the Popular Forces outpost at Nuoc Vang received a similar attack. Again friendly casualties were sustained. The Battalion's medical section plus a two APC security force from Charlie Battery was dispatched to the scene. The casualties were successfully brought to Phuoc Vinh by this force.<sup>79</sup>

Charlie Battery continued to go on turkey shoots throughout the Winter and Spring of 1967, displacing a total of six times to various locations around Phuoc Vinh. On two occasions they displaced to the village of An Linh to support Special Forces operations, firing preparatory fires against a VC base camp. The most spectacular turkey shoot occurred on May 28, 1967 when the "C" Battery 8" platoon displaced to a position south of the Song Be river to support Operation DALLAS. Although the battery was scheduled to shoot preparation fires around a landing zone to be used later in the day, it not do this as they had no air clearance. Meanwhile the Sigma team of Special Forces reported an estimated two VC battalions dug in north of Phuoc Vinh. The Battalion Commander immediately requested and received permission to withdraw the battery's support of Operation DALLAS. The 8" platoon was then taken to Nuoc Vang where they joined the 175mm guns (in base camp) in firing at this enemy force. A total of forty-five 175mm rounds and fifty-three 8" rounds were fired at twenty-five targets in the area of the two battalions.<sup>80</sup>

Battery "A" participated in turkey shoots also, displacing a total of 11 times. During some of their turkey shoots the battery stayed in the field for periods of up to a week. The battery supported a road clearing operation during Operation JUNCTION CITY and supported at various times the Special Forces camps of Tong Le Chan, Minh Thanh, Chon Thanh and Bo Duc. On one occasion the battery's fires were able to break the back of a mortar attack against Tong Le Chan. On another occasion (March 18, 1967) the 8" platoon, then in the field south of Quan Loi, fired 70 rounds in 20 minutes supporting an element of the 9th Division. This friendly force was engaged in brutal combat

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<sup>77</sup>The Redleg Courier, Vol. 1, No. 6, dtd 12 Feb 67, p. 3.

<sup>78</sup>GO 3480, HQ, 1st Inf Div, dtd 21 May 67.

<sup>79</sup>GO 3342, HQ, 1st Inf Div, dtd 17 May 67.

<sup>80</sup>SITREP, dtd 19 May 67.

with a medium sized VC force. Twenty-seven VC were killed and fourteen bunkers were destroyed.<sup>81</sup>

On March 17-19, 1967 the Battalion stumbled onto some good shooting quite by accident. By monitoring the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division radio frequency, the Battalion was able to find that the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry was receiving intense contact near the village of Bau Bang. The S-3 immediately offered the Battalion's services, which resulted in approximately 300 rounds of 8" and 175mm fire against the enemy's position. Other artillery units from Phuoc Vinh as well as from the base at Lai Khe joined in the melee. Over 200 VC were killed in action. The 6/27th fired blocking fires and defensive concentrations.<sup>82</sup>

The Phuoc Vinh base camp was hit by three consecutive mortar attacks on the evenings of May 11-13, 1967. No direct hits were received by either Headquarters or Charlie Batteries, though several rounds landed close. The worst of the attacks occurred on May 11, 1967, when nine helicopters from the 162d Assault Helicopter Company were destroyed by mortars. Twelve persons were wounded by shrapnel. Two persons from Headquarters Battery received shrapnel wounds in the attack of May 12, 1967. The bubble on the Battalion's OH-13 helicopter was damaged that same night.

The Phuoc Vinh base camp's countermortar program was controlled directly from the Battalion's operations center during the absence of direct support artillery headquarters. The response of the various artillery units to these enemy mortars was rapid and impressive. Direct communications had been established between the Battalion's operations center and all other fire direction centers in Phuoc Vinh. The first countermortar round was launched against the VC positions on an average of three minutes after the first enemy rounds had landed within the Phuoc Vinh perimeter. A total of 511 rounds of countermortar fire were expended the first night, 1,980 the second night and 1,909 the third night. It was felt that the countermortar program of May 12, 1967 triggered the enemy's attack prematurely, causing it to be erratic and of short duration. Air strikes and gunships also pounded the VC mortar positions. This continued US offensive eventually silenced the enemy mortars. Continued practice of the countermortar program resulted in even better reaction times for the participating artillery units.<sup>83</sup>

Bravo Battery continued its operations in the north throughout this period. On February 20, 1967, at 2314 hours, this battery became the first US artillery unit to fire into North Vietnam. The targets were a series of anti-aircraft weapons that were firing at a US spotter plane. The

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<sup>81</sup>Interview, CPT Ervin F. Kamm, A Btry CO, 7 Jun 67.

<sup>82</sup>Interview, MAJ Carl W. Haustein Jr., Bn XO, 6 Jun 67.

<sup>83</sup>Interview, MSG Austin Price Jr., Bn Opns Sgt, 6 Jun 67.

battery was credited with destroying one anti-aircraft weapon and damaging an additional three others.<sup>84</sup>

Battery "B" supported at least two operations conducted by the Marines. On February 2, 1967 a platoon of 175mm guns plus the FDC section displaced to Dong Ha to support the 12th Marines on Operation CHINOOK. They stayed 12 days. On March 24, 1967 the battery displaced to Gio Linh, two miles south of the DMZ. This was to relieve another battery of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery on Operation HIGHRISE.<sup>85</sup>

The war along the DMZ significantly escalated during March, 1967. As a result, Battery "B" was hit by a number of large mortar and rocket attacks. On March 6, 1967 the battery, still at Camp J. J. Carroll, was hit by over 450 incoming mortar rounds. Approximately 45 rounds landed in the battery area itself. Some guns and vehicles were slightly damaged and four men were wounded by shrapnel (none seriously). Several tents received direct hits and all were damaged by shrapnel. One man was in one end of a tent when a round landed in the other end. He was uninjured. Some of these rounds were 140mm fin stabilized rockets.<sup>86</sup>

"B" Battery received more of the same treatment after their arrival at Gio Linh. They averaged 20 incoming mortar rounds a night for the first two weeks. To protect themselves, the battery moved underground. Only the guns and the mess tent remained on the surface. This procedure afforded fairly adequate protection for the men, as shown by the battery's low casualty figures (as of April 24, 1967 no significant casualties had been sustained).<sup>87</sup>

As a result of the severe mental pressure of living under the constant threat of mortar attacks, and because of the primitive living conditions, morale of the men of Battery "B" began to slip a bit. Several men approached nervous breakdowns, and one man was sent to a psychiatrist for consultation. In order to give the men as much respite as was possible from their hard lives, the R&R program was emphasized, field showers and additional fortifications were constructed. Religious services were held and a good program of keeping the men informed of the situation around them were instituted.<sup>88</sup>

Shortly thereafter Battery "B" became involved in some spectacular action. On May 2, 1967 the North Vietnamese hit Gio Linh with 1,000 rounds of artillery fire from 11 different in North Vietnam and in the DMZ. The communists fired 105mm artillery and 82mm mortar rounds onto the hilltop base, aiming specifically at the 175mm "Long Toms" used to fire across the DMZ into North Vietnam. Two Marines were killed and 73 wounded during the attack. A second attack just after midnight poured fifty 82mm mortar rounds onto Gio Linh, wounding four Marines. At the same time the Marine base at Dong Ha was hit by 50 rounds of Russian made 140mm rockets and 82mm mortars. Eleven Americans were killed and 67 wounded at Dong Ha. Marines swept

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<sup>84</sup>The Redleg Courier, Vol. 1, No. 7, dtd 1 May 67, p. 4.

<sup>85</sup>Ltr, CPT Albert R. Pannell to LTC Edward C. O'Connor, dtd 26 Feb 67.

<sup>86</sup>The Redleg Courier, Vol. 1, No. 7, dtd 1 May 67, p. 4.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid, p. 4.

into the Communist positions after the attacks and found 50 rockets and 30 rocket sites. A third attack that same evening hit the Phu Bai airfield with 100 rounds of 82mm mortars.<sup>88</sup>

A week later the battery was involved in the pitched battle for the Special Forces camp at Con Thien, two miles south of the DMZ. While two reinforced North Vietnamese battalions attacked Con Thien, mortar and rocket attacks were launched simultaneously against three nearby artillery bases in an attempt to disrupt artillery support of that camp. Battery "B" received 150 mortar rounds that inflicted light damage to US artillery. Camp Carroll was hit by 20 Chinese 100mm rockets and Dong Ha was hit by 30 Russian made 140mm rockets. Highway One from Dong Ha to Gio Linh was cut off at the same time. The attack on Con Thien was repulsed after a three hour battle during which the North Vietnamese broke through part of the perimeter defense, destroying a number of bunkers by throwing satchel charges into them. As the enemy withdrew, heavy artillery fire from Dong Ha and Gio Linh blasted their escape routes, along with air strikes. Information received from ten captured NVA soldiers indicated that artillery scored direct hits on the Communists. Friendly casualties at Con Thien included 35 persons killed and 109 wounded, while the enemy suffered 179 killed. Over 100 enemy weapons were captured.<sup>89</sup>

Battery "B" received two more attacks shortly thereafter. On May 10, 1967 twenty Americans were wounded in a series of mortar, artillery and rocket attacks on Gio Linh and Con Thien. Hardest hit was Gio Linh, where 66 artillery rounds and thirty 82mm mortar rounds landed inside the camp at 1020 hours.<sup>90</sup> The next night a similar attack pelted Gio Linh with 85mm, 100mm and 122mm artillery fires, some from guns with ranges of up to 12 miles. Some of these weapons were fired by the enemy for the first time in the war. Ten Americans were wounded during the attacks.<sup>91</sup>

Battery 'B's two months at Gio Linh had resulted in their firing of an amazing number of rounds. From March 23d to May 18th the battery fired 13,056 rounds, many of which were into North Vietnam.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Stars & Stripes, 8 May 67.

<sup>89</sup>Stars & Stripes, 10 May 67.

<sup>90</sup>Stars & Stripes, 14 May 67.

<sup>91</sup>Stars & Stripes, 15 May 67.

<sup>92</sup>Ltr, CPT John H. Hiser to CPT Robert L. Koska, dtd 17 May 67.