



Operational Report
Lessons Learned
Headquarters 6/27th Artillery
Period Ending 31 Jan 1969

27TH ARTILLERY, 6TH BN DATE 31 JAN 1969

100

DECLASSIFIED
NND 735017
AUTHORITY
D.I. NARA DATE 8/23

CONFIDENTIAL

CPK

AVHGC-DST (11 Mar 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 4 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning emplacement of collimator, page 8, paragraph 2b (1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2. Concur, however, after the weapon has been laid for direction the collimator may be positioned 15 to 48 feet to the left front of the panoramic telescope sight at a deflection established by unit SOP. Depending on the weapon, the best results are obtained from 17 to 35 feet. Using the MX991/U flashlight as a back up for the power source issued with the collimators is considered valid as a field expedient. This information will be disseminated to all USARV artillery units in Vietnam.

b. Reference item concerning maximum ordinates, page 8, paragraph 2b (2) and 1st Indorsement paragraph 2b. Concur, however, the solution adopted by the 6th Battalion 27th Artillery is only one of several used in Vietnam. The solution offered by the 6th Battalion 27th Artillery will be made available to other USARV artillery units.

c. Reference item concerning logistics, telescope equipment, page 10, paragraph 2e and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e; nonconcur. Adjustment of the M137 mount counter mechanism is authorized at depot level only (TM 9-1240-293-34). DSU's have neither the tools nor the skilled personnel available. Dismantling the M137 mount in the field will result in contamination of the gears and subsequent failure. A double check for setting elevation is available on the M107/M110 weapons system. The M15 fire control quadrant, located on the right side of the gun cradle, should be used to set elevation. The gunner's quadrant may then be used to double check the setting. The unit will be so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
6th Bn, 27th Arty
II FFV

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

COL HEAD, ACOFS, G3
RECORDED COPY - RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

206-027
148-05

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CH DST DIV	
CH MS BR	
CH DOC BR	
CH TNG BR	
A/O	

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (11 Mar 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

MFR: ORLL was staffed through:

G3 Opns: MAJ Hill/4636
G4: MAJ Kaplan/4684
ACTION OFFICER: MAJ ROBBINS/LBN 4433

CONCURRENCE/NONCONCURRENCE: Not required.

COL Read, ACoRS, G3
RECORD COPY - RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
EXEMPTED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

CH DST DIV	
CH MS BR	
CH DOC BR	
CH TAG BR	
A/O	

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY
DATE 3/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFB-C (6 February 1969) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS-CSPOR-65 (B1)

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289, 16 February 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-PAC, APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

2. Pertinent comments follows

- a. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b(1): Concur. This information is being disseminated to the other 155mm towed howitzer units within this command.
- b. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b(2): Concur. This procedure expedites the determination and posting of air data. This information will be disseminated to all elements within this command.
- c. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b(3): Concur. Inoperative panoramic telescopes, M115, were detected on two occasions during the past quarter in the 6th Bn, 27th Arty because of their requirement that a physical check of the rotating head be made prior to and during each mission. Recommend that this information be disseminated to other 8"/175mm units.
- d. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2d: Concur. The prescribed 23d Artillery Group method of fire when firing intelligence targets is Platoon one round for heavy artillery and Battery one round for light and medium artillery. Such expenditures are adequate for unobserved targets. Effective immediately, intelligence targets which are fired as observed missions will be fired as "Will Adjust" missions. This policy will entail larger expenditures on intelligence targets but should serve to provide better surveillance on these targets.
- e. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2e: Concur. The M137, telescope mount, is assembled to the trunnion end, by the direct support maintenance unit when the M110 or M107 is delivered in country. 610th Maintenance Battalion has been notified of the problem that exists when the M158 cradle mount is changed. An unsatisfactory equipment report has been submitted. Further recommend that 1st Logistical Command be made aware of this condition.

3. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.

Harold G De Arment

Copy Furnished
HQ, 6th Bn, 27th Arty

HAROLD G DE ARMENT
Colonel. PA

Commanding GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
1440 735017
AUTHORITY
DATE 7/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (8 Feb 69) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (VIC: WA18AA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 9 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DE, APO 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for the period ending
31 January 1969, as inclosed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
Classified Inclosures

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 DATE 7/23

CONFIDENTIAL

8 MAR 1969

AVFB-FAC (8 Feb 69) 2d Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC:
 WA18AA) Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)(U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFEC-RE,
 APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period, except as noted below.

2. Reference Section 2, para 2b(1), Employment of Collimators. Concur with para 2a of 1st Indorsement with the following addition: the collimator should be placed close enough to the sight that at least two numbers can be read; the maximum distance in any case will not exceed 48 feet.

B.E. Huffman Jr
 B.E. HUFFMAN, JR.
 Brigadier General, USA
 Commanding

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE
 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
 SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY
DATE 7/23

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 6TH BATTALION 27TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96490

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Personnel.

(1) The 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery remained assigned to the 23d Artillery Group. The organic batteries of the Battalion were not detached during this period. On 26 November 1968, the 234th (UIC: FKX) and the 260th (UIC: G3S) Field Artillery Detachments (Radar) were attached to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery for all purposes, to include promotion, transfer and requisitioning of personnel, by General Order 104, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group. Effective 30 November 1968, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (UIC: A2H) was detached from the 23d Artillery Group and, subsequently, the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, by United States Army, Vietnam, General Order 5590, dated 4 December 1968. By the same General Order, Battery F, 16th Artillery (UIC: A2K) was assigned to the 23d Artillery Group, and further attached to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery. There was no change of personnel involved, only a change in unit designation. The 234th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar) was detached from the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery by 23d Artillery Group General Order 122, dated 26 December 1968, effective 26 December 1968.

(2) At the end of the reporting period, the assigned personnel strength of the Battalion, including Battery F, 16th Artillery, was under the authorized strength. The following shortages exist in the prescribed grades.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 135017
 1 NAVA DATE: 7/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC 8 February 1969
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
 Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
13B4	Operations & Intelligence	12	5
13B4	Section Chief	26	15
76Y4	Unit Supply Sergeant	7	6
13E2	Fire Direction Computer	31	26
13A1	Cannoneer	256	201
13B4	Gunner	18	9

(3) The morale of the Battalion remained high, with the R & R program the biggest morale booster. The following is a breakdown of the R & R allocations:

<u>SITE</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>		<u>DECEMBER</u>		<u>JANUARY</u>	
	<u>Req</u>	<u>Recd</u>	<u>Req</u>	<u>Recd</u>	<u>Req</u>	<u>Recd</u>
Hawaii	12	8	13	8	8	8
Tokyo	2	2	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	2	2	3	3	4	4
Bangkok	12	6	10	8	17	17
Sydney	11	9	19	9	15	9
Kuala Lumpur	1	1	0	0	2	2
Taipei	5	6	8	8	3	3
Penang	1	1	0	0	1	1
Singapore	0	0	0	0	4	4
In-country	0	0	8	6	8	8

135617
AUTHORITY
REF. MARK DATE 7/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC 8 February 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)

(4) There were no significant morale or disciplinary problems. There were no court martials during the quarter. Article 15 punishment was administered as shown.

<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
19	20	23

(5) During this period there were three (3) casualties due to hostile action (WIA).

(6) Awards and decorations presented to members of this command include twelve (12) Bronze Star Medals (Service), Seven (7) Air Medals, four (4) Army Commendation Medals (Achievement), fourteen (14) Army Commendation Medals (Service) and three (3) Purple Hearts.

(7) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents significantly affecting operations.

(8) Religious services were provided by Chaplains from the 1st Cav Division (AM) for all units.

b. Operations.

(1) During this period, the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in several operations and displaced units as indicated below.

(a) On 1 November 1968, Battery F, 16th Artillery displaced from Phuoc Vinh, RVN, to Tong Le Chon, RVN, closing at 2400 hours. The assigned mission was GSR to 1st Infantry Division Artillery in operation "Fish Hook". The personnel and equipment were transported by C-130 aircraft. A fire base was established nearby the US Special Forces camp at Tong Le Chon, secured initially by the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion. Extensive engineer assistance was required to clear fields of fire and cut out additional area from the jungle. On 12 November 1968, the mission was changed to GSR 1st Cav Division Artillery, and the security of the fire base was provided by one company of the 5/7 Cav Battalion. The Battery has remained at Tong Le Chon throughout the period.

(b) With the arrival of the 1st Division (AM) into the III Corps Tactical Zone in early November, the mission of this Battalion was changed. The 1st Cav Division (AM) replaced the 1st Infantry Division in the area surrounding all firing batteries of the Battalion. On 12 November 1968



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA) Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

the mission of the batteries were assigned as shown.

Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery: GSR 1st Cav Division Arty
 Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery: GSR 1st Cav Division Arty
 Battery C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery: GS II FFORCEV
 Battery F, 16th Artillery: GSR 1st Cav Division Arty

(c) On 1 November, one forward observer party was provided to the 5th ARVN Division to assist in fire planning and artillery adjustment. The party returned on 8 November 1968.

(d) The responsibility for the operation of the aircraft warning control center and fire support coordination center at Phuoc Vinh was transferred from the 23d Artillery Group to the 1st Cav Division (AM). Consequently, on 15 November 1968, two officers and six EM rejoined the Battalion operations section at Quan Loi, RVN.

(e) On 5 November 1968, plans were submitted to II FFORCEV Artillery for the implementation of a Ready Reaction Artillery Force. Battery F, 16th Artillery received the mission of primary Ready Reaction Artillery in II FFORCEV Artillery. The Battery was assigned the responsibility of being prepared to move two howitzers and required fire direction equipment by fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft to any point within the II FFORCEV area of interest within thirty (30) minutes of notification. To date, the final plans have not yet been approved.

(f) On 25 November 1968, the 260th and 234th Field Artillery Detachments (Radar) assumed operations at Quan Loi and Phuoc Vinh respectively. Although attached to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, they were under the operational control of the unit responsible for base camp defense.

(g) On 1 December 1968, a platoon of 8 inch Howitzers from Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery displaced from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh, RVN, by surface convoy. The mission remained the same; however, the displacement enabled the platoon to more effectively attack hard target complexes in the area, and to further assist the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division (AM). The platoon occupied LZ "Kelly" (XU 732084) which was secured by the 2/12 Cav Battalion. Enroute, the convoy was ambushed, with negative casualties or damage; however, it demonstrated the requirement for adequate convoy security. Artillery coverage was readily available and the rapid response prevented any damage. Resupply of Class V was accomplished by C-130 aircraft. On 6 December 1968, the platoon returned to Quan Loi where it rejoined its battery.

(h) During December, liaison visits to all US Special Forces "A" Detachments were made to revise planned defensive concentrations (DEFCONS).

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 NARA DATE: 1/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGZ-YC 8 February 1969
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
 Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(1) On 2 January 1969 the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery fired the 300,000 round of 8 inch and 175MM Artillery in the Republic of Vietnam. The round was fired by Battery A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery in a short ceremony. (See paragraph g(3) below).

(j) Six forward observer parties were provided to the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions during December 1968 and January 1969. The operations usually lasted from five to seven days.

(2) The following number of missions were fired with the total amounts of ammunition expended as indicated.

UNIT	MISSIONS FIRED	AMMUNITION EXPENDED		
		155MM	175MM	8"
Battery A, 6/27 Arty	2747		5611	3881
Battery B, 6/27 Arty	3566		4568	4965
Battery C, 6/27 Arty	2645		2471	5179
Battery F, 16th Arty	1831	12,521		
TOTALS: 10,789		12,521	12,650	14,025

c. Training.


(1) Continued emphasis has been placed on gun crew drill and FDC section training. A gunnery evaluation team has been organized within the Battalion operations section. This team conducts monthly inspections of each firing battery to assist the units in developing sound gunnery procedures and to detect errors in procedures.

(2) New in-country arrivals have received their initial training at the battery, with emphasis placed on Vietnam peculiar training. It is anticipated that future replacements will receive in-country training at the 82d Airborne Brigade processing center in Phu Loi, RVN.

(3) An eight hour instruction program in the use of airlift equipment and helicopter loading procedures was conducted for selected personnel from each battery. The instruction was conducted by personnel from the Aerial Equipment Supply Company, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at Quan Loi.

(4) A three-day forward observer training program was conducted at the Battalion Headquarters in Quan Loi for four Officers and 10 enlisted

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSAA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

men. The purpose was to provide each battery with a trained forward observer section. Additional training will be conducted in each battery.

d. Intelligence.

(1) The Battalion has continued its program of attacking hard targets and is continuously revising its active target list based on current intelligence.

(2) During the reporting period, Battalion aerial observers flew 285 VR missions consisting of 674 hours, including 79 hours of night VR. 282 significant sightings were made resulting in 361 fire missions.

(3) Target surveillance this quarter was especially rewarding. The Battalion was credited with 112 enemy killed by artillery (KBA) and an additional 102 possible KBA. The firing batteries participated in several significant engagements in which surveillance could not be distributed among all firing units. The total enemy killed by artillery in these missions was 226. The continued attack on bunker complexes resulted in 313 bunkers destroyed.

(4) The following security clearances were granted or validated during the reporting period. Top Secret (clearances validated - 8), Secret (clearances validated - 55), Final Secret (clearances granted - 24), Confidential (clearances granted - 12).


e. Logistics.

(1) An ammunition supply point was established at Quan Lo and Phuoc Vinh in early November 1968. Consequently, Battery A and Battery C, 6/27 Artillery respectively were resupplied directly. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery and Battery F, 16th Artillery were resupplied solely by aircraft from Bien Hoa.

(2) Service Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery has continued to be responsible for the operation of the 23d Artillery Group Rear. During this period, Service Battery assisted in the resupply of rations to isolated fire bases occupied by 23d Artillery Group firing batteries. During certain periods, rations and ammunition were being airlifted to seven different locations.

f. Organization. The 234th and 260th Field Artillery Detachments were attached to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery on 25 November 1968. On 26 December the 234th Detachment was detached from this organization.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC 8 February 1969
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
 Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations.

(1) Emplacement of Collimators

(a) OBSERVATION. By increasing the distance between the panoramic telescope and the collimator to 40 feet or greater, the 155MM towed howitzer can shift trails through 6400 mils without picking up more displacement than can be corrected in the collimator pattern.

(b) EVALUATION. The standard night lighting device for the collimator restricts the distance it can be placed from the howitzer because of the 35 foot cord from the power source to the collimator. By utilizing a standard MX991/U flashlight and attaching it to the collimator with a steel helmet camouflage cover elastic head band, the night lighting problem is solved and the collimator can be placed at any desired distance from the weapon. The greater the distance between the panoramic telescope and the collimator, the smaller the displacement caused by shifting or firing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this night lighting method be adopted as a field expedient for 155MM towed howitzer units, and collimators be placed at least 40 feet from the panoramic telescope whenever ground conditions permit.

(2) Maximum Ordinates.

(a) OBSERVATION. A scale of maximum ordinates should be constructed on GPTs.

(b) EVALUATION. It is imperative that air clearance procedures be initiated as rapidly as possible upon receipt of a fire mission. An essential part of the data necessary for obtaining air clearance is the maximum ordinate of the projectile's flight. This information can be extracted from Table G of the Tabular Firing Tables. However, the data is rendered in meters rather than feet as required by the clearing agencies. Further, for the 175MM gun and the 8 inch Howitzer, charge 7, the maximum ordinate is given as a function of range in 1000 meter increments. Interpolation for intermediate ranges requires a time consuming calculation by hand.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 DATE 3/23

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA) Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

It is suggested that using the data in Table G, additional data be interpolated at 100 meter increments in range. By converting the data of Table G from meters to feet before interpolating, the resulting data will be given in feet, saving some calculation over interpolating directly in meters. By laying a strip of Scotch Magic Marking tape on the face of the GFT directly under the range scale, a scale of maximum ordinates may then be constructed on the tape. After constructing the scale, another strip of tape should be laid over it to protect the markings. Information for the determination of maximum ordinates is readily available in the course of routine data calculations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a scale of maximum ordinates as a function of range, in 100 meter increments be constructed on each units GFTs.

(3) Fire Control Equipment .

(a) OBSERVATION. During the last quarter, three panoramic telescopes M115, became inoperative as a result of loose rotating heads.

(b) EVALUATION. The rotating head is threaded onto the deflection mechanism and held in place by three small set screws. During the course of firing, these set screws can work loose allowing the rotating head to unscrew itself. As a result, deflections set off on a sight with a loose rotating head may cause considerable error if the deficiency is not detected. As an example, should the rotating head become unscrewed by as little as one thirty-second (1/32) of a turn, it would yield a two hundred (200) mil firing error.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That firing batteries, in their SOP, require each gunner to make a physical check of the rotating head by gently manipulating it to determine any "play" prior to and during each mission.

c. Training. None

d. Intelligence. Target Intelligence Surveillance.

(1) OBSERVATION. Intelligence targets which are fired as observed missions should be shot as "will adjust" fire missions rather than PLATOON (1) or BATTERY (1) as normal intelligence targets.

(2) EVALUATION. Experience indicates that PLATOON (1) fire for heavy artillery and BATTERY (1) fire for medium and light artillery is insufficient to allow an aerial observer to make any surveillance in double and triple canopy jungle. During a two-week period in December 1968, the

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Battalion conducted an evaluation of observed intelligence target firing. During this time, the Battalion fired a total of ninety-six (96) II Field Force Artillery Intelligence targets using method of fire shown above. Battalion aerial observers were only able to give positive surveillance on one of these missions. On all other missions the artillery rounds failed to open up the canopy enough to enable the observer to give any surveillance. During this trial period, Battalion visual reconnaissance aircraft flew a total of thirty-eight (38) hours out of a possible one hundred thirty-two (132) hours, firing intelligence targets, or slightly over twenty-eight percent (28%). It is the opinion of this Battalion that the results obtained from this evaluation prove that this method of firing intelligence targets, in addition to consuming valuable visual reconnaissance flying time, contributes little to the observed firing program of the Battalion.

(3) RECOMMENDATION.

(a) That the majority of the intelligence targets be fired as unobserved missions, using the prescribed 23d Artillery Group methods of fire.


(b) That those intelligence targets that are fired as observed missions be fired as "will adjust" missions, allowing the aerial observer to determine the number of rounds to be fired in order to obtain positive surveillance.

e. Logistics. Telescope Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION. In two instances when the cradle mount, M158, was replaced and the telescope mount, M137, was reinstalled, the variance between elevations determined with the gunner's quadrant and those read from the elevation counter were greater than could be corrected by inserting an elevation correction factor.

(2) EVALUATION. On a new weapon, M110 or M107, the telescope mount, M137, is located on the trunion end by the manufacturer. In general, the manufacturer accomplishes this by using an adapter plate and dowel pins. The result is an M137 mount located accurately enough that when the tube is level and the elevation counter reads zero (0), the elevation level vial bubble is centered. Obviously, the location of this mount is peculiar to each motor carriage, cradle and cannon assembly combination. In the present situation there is no way to adjust the M137 mount except by insertion of a correction factor. Unfortunately, the correction factor

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-YC

8 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WALSA)
 Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPCR-65 (RI)

is limited to +9 mils and in practice proves insufficient to correct actual variances. As a result, the gunner's quadrant must be used as the sole method of setting off the elevation, with no double check being possible.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Direct Support Ordnance Units must arrive at a method for properly adjusting the M137 mount when it must be replaced on a new cradle in a field combat environment.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

Richard S. Bullock
 RICHARD S. BULLOCK
 LTC FA
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

- 2 - Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific
- 3 - Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
- 6 - Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group

CONFIDENTIAL